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Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Disjunction: linking two or more statements by an inclusive "or". The disjunction is only false when all disjuncts are false. Notation v. See also adjunction, alternation, conjunction, compound sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Disjunction - Dictionary of Arguments
III 15 Disjunction of prop > disjunctive predicates/Armstrong: a single predicate "M" could be used for "A or B or C" > "grue"/Armstrong: simplified form: green becomes blue and at the same time blue becomes green - new pair of pred: bleen/grue: nothing changes relative to the pair: green> blue: remains bleen, blue> green. Remains grue - but: a thing that remains blue changes relative to the new pair bleen/grue - Question: what kind of predicates priority? III 68 Disjunction/Disjunctive Properties/System/Order/F.o.Th./Armstrong: Example, a natural system contains three fundamental laws: Fs are Gs, Hs are Js, Ks are Ls - these are united as follows: we define M: "an F or an H or a K" N: "a G or a J or an L" - then we have a single "fundamental law": "Ms are Ns" - then "F is an N": less informative but apparent improvement: G = J = L: no more information than "F is G v J v L". But if "N" is a true property, then "G", "J", "L" are merely artificial subdivisions (Armstrong pro) (f.o.th disjunction, identity) (>grue) - (s) otherwise we would always have to say "yellow or black Banana"). III 151 Disjunctive properties: being G or H": ArmstrongVs - Problem: disj. laws: does not the unrealized alternative need to be missing first? - disjunctional predicates always possible, but no real relation_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |